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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Utah State Constitution. 
In a criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, .. The shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself, . . . 
United State Constitution. Fifth Amendment. 
. . .nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;.... 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The State advances three arguments. 
(1) They assert the stop was constitutional. They suggest a citizen's call to dispatch is 
per se reliable and not subject to scrutiny. 
(2) They assert no violation of either the Fifth Amendment or Art. I Section 12 of the 
Utah State Constitution when the trial court allowed the State to use as evidence defendant's 
assertion of his right to not give evidence. They suggest there is no separate State constitutional 
right recognized as differing from the Federal. 
(3) Thirdly, they claim that sufficient evidence existed to justify the conviction entered by 
a jury. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A citizen's report must have an appearance of being reliable. The citizen's call reported a 
person who had talked to his son with an odor of alcohol. From this, the caller concluded he was 
intoxicated. Neither is indicative of criminal behavior. The only corroboration offered by the police 
was the caller's information matched the description of the vehicle. 
2. This Court has prior to date noted the uniqueness of the Constitutional protections afforded an 
accused under the Utah Constitution. The Court held Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
recognizes an independent right. 




The officer followed the vehicle. He reported no traffic violations but noted some 
weaving within the lane of travel. 
The State argues an odor of alcohol while talking to the caller's son is sufficient to justify 
the stop the caller's conclusion of him being clearly intoxicated. State v. Droneburq. 781 P.2d 
1303 (Utah App. 1989) (conclusions without detail prohibited). 
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The State argues a 911 call gave sufficient cause to conduct a level two detention. 
They cite Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231 as support but give no mention to the qualifiers 
noted in Mulcahv. See also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah. Ct. App. 1992). 
In Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231, the Court found a "citizen-informant" is high 
on the reliability scale but not conclusive. Id. at 219. Under Mulcahv, the court should conduct a 
three part examination: (1) "the type of tip or informant involved"; (2) "whether the informant gave 
enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop"; and (3) corroboration of the 
information by law enforcement through a "police officer's personal observations." Id. at 235-36. 
TYPE OF INFORMANT 
In two recent decisions, this Court found a call to dispatch requires examination, even 
though from a citizen. Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 Ut. App. 30,177 P. 3d 655, cert, denied 199 
P.3d 367 (Utah 2008); State v. Rovbal, 2008 Ut. App 286, cert, granted 200 P.3d 193 (Utah 
2008). Both cases require the source to appear to be credible. See State v. Case. 884 P.2d 
1274 (Utah App. 1994). 
In Salt Lake City v. Bench, the Court dealt with an ex-wife's call to dispatch advising 
that her ex-husband was driving drunk with her son. As here, the officer saw no corroborating 
evidence to confirm the ex-wife's report (driving slowly). The court questioned the source of the 
call (ex-wife). No details were given. Here, the caller's conclusion is based on a supposed odor 
of alcohol and a conversation with the caller's son. 
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In State v. Roybal, 2008 UT App 286,191 P.3d 822, a live-in girlfriend called 911 and 
reported a domestic dispute. She identified herself and stated that Roybal had just about 
assaulted her. She wanted him out of the house. The dispatch operator, as here inquired and 
asked her if Roybal had been drinking, and she replied that they both had been drinking. She 
gave no additional information about the quantity alcohol Roybal had consumed or the time 
period during which he had been drinking. The Court's inquiry focused not only on the source of 
the call but the detail provided (he had been drinking). 
Here the caller (Travis Bird) called, identified himself giving contact information. The 
defense argues the two remaining factors required under Mulcahv are absent: 
1)"whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal 
activity to support a stop"; and 
(2) Corroboration of the information by law enforcement through a "police 
officer's personal observations". 
DETAILS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
The State asserts sufficient detail of criminal behavior was given to warrant the stop 
(talked to his son/ odor of alcohol). See trial court's findings, paragraph ten (10). The trial court 
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itemized the detail of criminal activity being (a) talking to Bird's son; and (b) odor of alcohol. 
Neither is suggestive of criminality. 
Defendant argues the detail must be suggestive of criminal behavior. Sandy City v. 
Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011,1012-13 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (driving slow which is equally indicative 
of innocent behavior as criminal conduct is no justification to stop.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 
489 (Utah App. 1990) (avoiding a police roadblock may be innocent behavior and no justification 
for a traffic stop.) State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89-90 (defendant walking in a high crime area 
carrying a nylon bag late at night insufficient). 
Here the State attempts to infer cause from innocent conduct. Another example is 
State v. Tetmver,947 P.2d, (Utah App. 1997). There the trial court found four factors to give 
reasonable cause of criminality. After stopping for gas at a convenience store, (1) defendant wore 
his sunglasses after he entered the convenience store; (2) he and his passenger walked directly 
to the bathroom; (3) defendant's passenger was obviously intoxicated; and (4) defendant walked 
"off line" when he entered the convenience store. 
This Court found an innocent explanation may easily be given for each factor; i.e. many 
people wear sunglasses inside and many people walk directly to the bathroom when stopping for 
gasoline after an approximately fifty-mile stretch exists between stops. See also Reid v. 
Georgia,448 U.S. 438, 441; State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1186 (Utah.Ct.App. 1994); State v. 
Svkes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992). 
Defendant addresses first the odor of alcohol. 
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ODOR OF ALCOHOL 
The State cites State v. Abell, 2003 Ut 20,70 P.3d 98. AbeH is an 'administrative 
checkpoint' case and has little relevance. However, the dicta in Abell suggest that officer cannot 
make a determination of impairment based on the odor of alcohol alone. They need to observe 
the driver's appearance, attentiveness, speech patterns, and reaction time. See also State v. 
Tripp, 2008 UT App 388,197 P.3d 99; State v. Bisseqqer, 2003 Ut. App. 256, 76 P.3d 178 (odor 
of alcohol detected but other testing indicated no impairment). State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 
(Utah App. 1996) (Odor of alcohol adds nothing to investigation to drinking while driving.) 
Following Abell's logic, the Supreme Court in State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,164 P.3d 
397 noted that Utah courts generally find that DUI probable cause requires slurred speech, 
bloodshot eyes, and the smell of alcohol accompanied by failed field sobriety tests. They found 
although Worwood had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and the smell of alcohol this was not 
sufficient basis (de facto arrest) to conclude that Worwood had exceeded the legal alcohol limit. 
The State cites State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185-86 (Utah App. 1996); State v. 
Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah App. 1994); and State v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062,1064 (Utah 
App. 1990). They suggest that these cases find the odor of alcohol is sufficient. 
In Otteson, the officer stopped a vehicle due to a traffic violation (unsafe distance of 
travel) and found the driver to be a minor. The officer then noted the odor of alcohol. The Court's 
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decision rested on the driver being a minor in possession of alcohol (U.C.A. 32a-12-209). Bean 
is another minor in possession case. 
In Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990), the court found a level 
one police encounter (no level two detention); thereby not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection. 
This Court in State v. Roybal, noted consumption of alcohol does not equate to 
intoxication. People frequently drink alcohol without becoming impaired (clearly intoxicated). A 
person could be three-hundred pounds and consumed only two or three light beers over the 
course of several hours. If so, two or three light beers would not have affected his ability to safely 
operate a vehicle or caused his blood alcohol level to rise above the proscribed limit. The mere 
consumption of alcohol does not justify a reasonable inference of being impaired. 
TALKING WITH A MINOR 
As in Tetmver, the State seemingly tries to support an inference of criminality from 
innocent conduct. Arguably the State construction may demonize youth coaches, children 
instructors, church leaders, school teachers, community groups and adults who converse with 
children as common gracious conduct. 
n 
DESCRIPTION OF VEHICLE AS CORROBORATION 
The trial court found no corroboration in the appellant's driving pattern. The Court 
limited the officer's corroboration to the description of the vehicle (Jeep with dealer plates). 
Court's Conclusions, paragraph 10. 
In Florida v. J. L, 529 U.S. 266 (2000), police received an anonymous tip describing a 
person with a weapon. The tipster provided an accurate description of the suspect. The State, as 
here, argued tipster's description of the subject was accurate and thereby sufficient corroboration 
for the tip. The Court held that the accurate description may help the police correctly identify the 
person but "does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity". Id. at 
272. 
See State v. Case, 884 P.2d at 1279 (stating that corroborating details relating to a 
person's physical description "is not corroboration of criminal activity, only of physical 
characteristics that by themselves have no relevance to criminal activity") See also State v. 
Alvarez, 2006 UT 61,147 P.3d 425. Also State v. Hughes.353 N.C. at 210, 539 S.E.2d at 632 
(holding that the fact that defendant was "headed in[the] general direction" that informant 
indicated did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion). 
WEAVING WITHIN LANE OF TRAVEL 
This Court ruled in State v. Morris, 2009 UT App 181 (Utah App. Court July 2009) to the 
contrary. There the officer attempted to justify the stop because the driver had weaved within the 
lane of travel; particularly bumping the white divider lines as other vehicles passed. In Morris, the 
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State conceded that Mr. Morris's driving pattern did not "justify the [traffic] stop solely on improper 
lane travel." The Court cited Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-710 (1)(a) (2005) (requiring motorists to 
"keep the vehicle as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane"). 
The State also fails to note the holding in State v. Bello, 871 P.2d at 587 holding that 
one instance of briefly crossing the center line of a highway followed by two minutes of no 
swerving was not sufficient; requiring "only that a vehicle remain entirely in a single lane as 
nearly as practical. 
The trial court found Officer Johnson's testimony inconsistent referencing the weaving 
within the lane. At the suppression hearing, the officer had reported the vehicle in the center 
dividing lane and weaving within the lane of travel. (SH 7 L. 22). The officer had reported 
making contact with the dividing line upon direct examination but under cross-examination, he 
reported to be within the lane of travel. (SH 9 L1-5). At the preliminary hearing, Officer Johnson 
had testified Mr. Vandyke was in the far right travel lane moving within his lane of travel. 
(Preliminary Hearing 26 L. 1-12). However, the officer consistently testified he saw no traffic 
violations. Trial Court Findings of Facts, Paragraphs 4-8. The trial court concluded the officer's 
corroboration observed by the officer was limited to the description of the vehicle given by the 
caller. Trial Court's Conclusions, paragraph 9-10. (The officer observed the same vehicle 
described with dealer plates.) The trial court did not utilize the minimal weaving as corroboration. 
Trial Court's Conclusions, Paragraph Nine. 
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Point 2 
State Constitutional Protections/Refusal to do Field Sobriety Testing 
The States argues the defendant has not developed a State Constitutional analysis. 
The State fails to note such analysis has already been undertaken and pronounced. 
The Supreme Court held as far back as 1905 the unique language adopted by the State 
Constitution as opposed to the Fifth Amendment. In Crooks v. Harmon, 29 Utah 304, 81 P. 95 
(1905) the Court stated: 
The word "testimony" is a restricted, limited term, consisting only of the statements of 
witnesses, while the word "evidence" is a comprehensive term, embracing not only 
testimony, or the statements of witnesses, but also -documents, written instruments, 
admissions of parties, and whatever may be submitted to a court or a jury to elucidate 
an issue or prove a case. 
The issue was then later addressed in Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980). 
Petitioner sought to enjoin judicial orders requiring suspects to furnish examples of his 
handwriting. 
The Hansen v. Owen Court noted the unique differences between the Fifth Amendment 
providing that "[No person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself and the state constitution providing "The accused shall not be compelled to give 
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evidence against himself." Considering the differing language, the Court found it significant that 
the framers of our Utah Constitution a broader language as noted in Crooks, i.d. at page 316. 
They found the phrase "to give evidence against himself," to be broader than the phrase 
"to be a witness against himself". They made the appropriate analysis under the Utah 
Constitution; giving life to the wording under Art. I Section 12. They found an order compelling 
the defendant to give a handwriting sampler was violative of the rights assured the Utah State 
constitution. 
In American Fork City v. Crosqrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court 
once again addressed the issue. This case related to defendant's submission to a chemical test 
for a DUI prosecution. Defendant argued the evidence was inadmissible since it was gained 
through compulsion (loss of license upon refusal). The Court again conducted the analysis under 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Crosqrove court overruled Hansen v. Owen. The lead opinion found Article I, 
Section 12 is limited in scope to those situations where the state seeks evidence of a testimonial 
or communicative nature. The opinion found the federal constitutional analysis persuasive; 
finding the Fifth Amendment only applied to 'testimonial' evidence. 
The justices in Crosqrove concurred in result but there was no consensus in reasoning. 
Justice Howe noted Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides a privilege from being 
compelled to give evidence against oneself. He found that since Crosgrove took the test, the 
privilege was waived. 
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Justice Stewart found Article I, Section 12 should be recognized as a privilege 
extending beyond the compulsion of oral testimony. He found Article I, Section 12 establishes a 
relationship in a criminal proceeding between the accused and the State that prevents the State 
from extracting confessions or admissions by whatever means it may devise. 
Justice Zimmerman found the privilege testimonial only. He thought the better 
approach was to address the issue in the context should be analyzed under Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution (illegal search). This approach would diminish Art. I Section 12 
protections except in the context of a courtroom. Yet, see his decision in Sandy City v. Larson. 
Justice Hall found the implied consent statute did not compel a driver to give evidence 
against himself. Justice Hall's holding was thereafter followed in Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 
137 (Utah 1987) when the Court addressed the issue again. They conducted a State 
constitutional analysis noting: 
Although decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other courts are 
not binding upon us in interpreting our state constitution, the reasoning in Neville is 
persuasive, and in this instance we do not interpret our state constitution differently. 
The Larson court found "no compulsion by the State aimed at coercing defendant to 
refuse to take the test". Yet the court noted that two penalties could be assessed upon refusal: 
(1) driver's license revocation, and (2) use of the refusal against the defendant in a criminal 
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prosecution. They avoided the question of whether the refusal was testimonial and 
communicative nature. 
This analysis under Article I Section 12 seemingly forbids any compulsion or penalty to be 
assessed against one's right. The defendant need not aide the State in his own prosecution. 
This aligns with the reasoning of coerced confessions under Fifth Amendment as well under 
State Constitutional protections. See Hale v. Henkei, 201 U.S. 43, (1906); Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420,433 (1984): Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973). Under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) the Court imposed a constitutional advisements prior to in-custody 
confessions. (Upon refusal in a DUI prosecution, officer is to admonish the defendant of the 
consequences of such act.) 
It also aligns with a current view of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 2000, Justice Thomas ( 
joined by Justice Scalia), authored a concurring opinion in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 
27,48 (2000). Justice Thomas noted that, historically, "substantial support [exists] for the view 
that the term 'witness1 (under the Fifth Amendment) meant a person who gives or furnishes 
evidence, a broader meaning than that which case law ascribes to the term." Justice Thomas 
specifically observed that during the debate over the ratification of the Federal Constitution four 
states proposed a bill of rights that would grant citizens a right against any governmental 
compulsion "to give evidence" — regardless of whether, in doing so, the person would "be a 
witness" against himself or herself. 
The holding in Hubbell barred the government from indicting an immunized witness based 
upon compelled documents produced by the witness (subpoena duces tecum). The Court 
dismissed the indictment based on such violation. The lead opinion written by Justice Stevens in 
Hubbell found the evidence compelled testimonial evidence. This holding runs contrary to the 
lead opinion in Crosqrove. 
See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (holding that the Fifth Amendment 
protected a suspect against the compelled production of books and papers. Also In Re Ariel 
a,383 Md. 240 (2004) 858 A.2d 1007 (a person cannot be compelled to inform the court of the 
whereabouts of the subject of the production order.) 
The holding in Hubbell suggests the Utah Constitution's language has broader meaning 
than merely compelled 'testimonial' evidence. As does the decision in Hubbell suggests the Fifth 
Amendment extends protection beyond 'testimonial' evidence. It would include compelling the 
defendant to do testing at the direction of the officer. 
CHEMICAL TESTS V. FIELD TESTS 
Defendant submits the case relating to chemical tests seemingly is settled. South Dakota 
v. Neville. 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Sandy City v. Larson. 733 P.2d 137 (Utah 1987). But as the trial 
court relied on U.C.A. 41-6a-520 (implied consent law) so did the Larson decision. 
However, this logic does not apply to field sobriety tests. The trial court here improperly 
expanded 'implied consent statute' to encompass field sobriety tests. 
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Similar to the procedure utilized in Arizona v. Miranda, defendant notes the officer's 
obligation via U.C.A. 41-6a-520 (2) and the State adopted DUI report form (subsection 10). If a 
person asserts a right to counsel or the right to silence, the officer is required to explain the 
implied consent law is civil in nature and not criminal; thereby these rights do not apply. See 
subsection five (5) of U.C.A. 41-6a-520. The officer here fail to so advise— leaving the 
defendant to believe his rights to refuse are guarded by either constitution. 
UTAH CASE LAW 
In Sandy City v. Larson, the court based its ruiing on finding the State did not compel 
defendant to refuse to take the chemical test. They found the implied consent statute required a 
defendant to provide evidence in the form of a breath sample but the statute also affords the 
driver the choice of refusing to take the test. The choice was a qualified. The court noted that two 
penalties could be assessed upon refusal: (1) driver's license revocation, and (2) use of the 
refusal against the defendant in a criminal prosecution. They held: 
Since a defendant is not compelled to refuse the test, it need not be decided 
whether such a refusal is physical evidence or evidence of a testimonial and 
communicative nature. 
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CASE LAW AS APPLIED TO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
Here, no statutory authorization exists for such physical testing. The implied consent 
law (U.C.A. 41-6a-520) applies only to chemical testing. U.C.A. 41-6a-520. This factor alone 
distinguishes Crosqrove and State v. Larson from the current facts. 
Secondly, the physical testing requires the defendant to affirmatively give 'evidence 
against himself. Such invokes the right to counsel and also the right to silence as noted in the 
defendant's protest (Fifth Amendment). Art. I Section 12, Utah State Constitution/ Fifth 
Amendment, U.S. Constitution. 
The language of Art I Section 12 provides individual protection—you shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against yourself. Here, the officer required the defendant to submit 
to field sobriety testing but if he refuses, it shall be considered to be evidence of guilt 
(intoxication). The language of the constitution is clear— Mr. Vandyke cannot be compelled to 
give evidence against his interest. He does not need to perform field testing. 
CONCLUSION 
The stop of the defendant was without a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 
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The assertion of the rights guaranteed under both the Federal and State Constitution is 
no evidence of guilt. The trial court committed error when the Court allowed the admission of 
such testimony. 
Dated this 11th day of August, 2009. 
Shelds 
Attorney for Appj 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J.KENT VANDYKE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 071403650 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained 
by the State of Utah in the instant case, to wit, statements and other observations of police leading 
to the Defendant's DUI arrest on September 25, 2007. Having already Ruled and Ordered in Court 
on January 16, 2008 that the Motion to Suppress be denied, the Court now makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Around 6:58pm on September 25, 2007, police dispatch received a phone call 
r i L - c i D 
Fourth Judicial District 
f Utah County,, State c O" 
ih n% t \ J ^ Deputy 
from a citizen informant who reported a drunk driver. The informant stated he 
was at the Sports Park in Spanish Fork and he identified the suspect vehicle as a 
green Jeep Cherokee, which was last seen heading out of the new part of the park 
towards Main Street. The informant identified the vehicle's dealer plate number 
as #6734002 and described the driver as having black hair and a goatee. In 
addition, the informant identified himself as Travis Bird and he gave his phone 
number. When asked by the dispatcher why Mr. Bird thought the driver was 
intoxicated, Mr. Bird noted the following: 
a. The driver walked past Mr. Bitd and his son, who the driver tried to talk 
with. 
b. Both Mr. Bird and his wife smelled alcohol on the driver's breath. 
c. The driver was "thoroughly intoxicated." based on the way he was acting. 
d. The driver tried to strike up a conversation with Mr. Bird's "little boy" 
2. Around 7pm on September 25, 2007, while traveling southbound on Main Street 
in Spanish Fork. Officer Matt Johnson of the Spanish Fork Police Department 
received a dispatch call on his laptop computer. He was dispatched to the area of 
the Sports Park (approximately 900 South Main Street) on a report of an 
intoxicated motorist. The police dispatch report read as follows: 
a. green Jeep Cherokee/poss dui/jnst leaving the new part of ball park 
6734002 dealer plate/male with goatee/tl one minute/went towards main st 
unk from there wralked past rp and could smell the alcohol on his breath 
and definitely intoxicated 
3. Soon after receiving the dispatch call, Officer Jolinson located a dark-colored Jeep 
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Cherokee with dealer plates turn left onto Main Street from Volunteer Drive, 
where the Sports Park was located. Officer Johnson followed the vehicle 
northbound on Main Street for approximately nine blocks without turning on his 
emergency lights. The Jeep Cherokee pulled to the shoulder of the road at 
approximately 50 North Main Street without any prompting from the police. 
4. At the preliminary hearing on December 19, 2007, Officer Johnson testified that, 
during the nine blocks, he observed that the "vehicle was traveling on the inside 
divider lane, and it would pull back into the travel lane. It would drift from side-
to-side within the travel lane, and then travel on the divider line, and then travel 
back into the travel lane again.*' 
5. At the suppression hearing on January 15, 2008, Officer Jolinson clarified his 
preliminary hearing testimony in describing that the driver drifted back and forth 
in the right-hand (outside) northbound lane of travel. The left rear wheel of the 
vehicle drove on top of the left hash marks (or left divider line) three times and 
drifted to the left without driving on top of the left hash marks one or two other 
times during the nine blocks of travel. Officer Johnson never saw the vehicle 
signal or change lanes during this observation. 
6. Although there is a conflict between the DUI report form and his written narrative 
report, Officer Jolinson maintains that the written narrative report is accurate, and 
that the vehicle turned from Volunteer Drive onto the far outside lane (or number 
2 lane) northbound on Main Street. 
7. Main Street in Spanish Fork is a four-lane road, with a center median strip. There 
are two travel lanes in each direction. The Jeep Cherokee was in the far right 
lane, closest to the curb for the entire nine blocks. It wove within the lane three to 
four times. Despite this, the officer testified that he did not observe any traffic 
violations. However, Officer Johnson testified that the driver's actions were 
concerning because Officer Johnson was attempting to observe a driving pattern, 
due to the report of the possible intoxicated motorist. Officer Johnson testified 
that these observations corroborated the dispatch report information. During this 
process, Officer Johnson did not run the dealer plate for more information. 
After the Cherokee pulled over to the side of the road on its own accord, Officer 
Johnson pulled in behind and then activated his emergency lights. After the lights 
were activated, the driver of the vehicle immediately exited the driver's side door. 
The Defendant wras identified as the driver and he turned and looked at Officer 
Johnson. Officer Johnson then asked the Defendant to get back into his car, 
which the Defendant agreed to do. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Although Officer Johnson did not initiate a traffic stop while the Defendant was 
driving since the Defendant puiied over to the shoulder of his own accord, the 
encounter between Officer Johnson and the Defendant escalated to a level two stop 
when the emergency lights were activated on Officer Johnson's car. At that point, 
the Defendant was not free to leave. Furthermore, when the Defendant exited his car 
and turned to see Officer Johnson, the officer's order to the Defendant to return to his 
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car clearly shows that he is not free to leave at that point. 
2. In order for the Defendant to prevail on his Motion to Suppress the level two stop, 
he must persuade the Court that Officer Johnson did not have '"reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring/5 U.C.A. § 77-23-103 (1992). The 
case law. as cited by the Defendant is very clear that simple weaving within the lane 
of travel with nothing more does not amount to reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity has occurred or is occurring. It is difficult to disagree with the language 
quoted by the Defendant in his memo from United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439,446 
(9th Cir. 2002): 
Indeed, if failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway or 
keeping one's eyes on the road were sufficient reasons to suspect a 
person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public 
would be subject each day to an invasion of their privacy. 
3. The State makes the valid argument that Officer Johnson had more than just the 
Defendant's weaving pattern to justify his activation of his overhead lights. The 
State correctly cites Utah Code Section 77-7-15 for the concept that a police officer 
may "stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions/5 
4. The Utah Court of Appeals states in the City of St George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 
(Utah App. 1997): 'The facts supporting reasonable suspicion may come from the 
officer's own observations as well as 'information, bulletins, or flyers received from 
other law enforcement sources.'...The legality of a stop based on information 
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imparted by another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to 
the officer originating the information or bulletin subsequently received and acted 
upon by the investigating officer. However, the investigating officer need not be 
actually informed of all the underlying facts known to the originating officer that 
established reasonable suspicion." 
The Defendant relies upon an earlier Utah Court of Appeals case. State v. Case^ 844 
P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), the rules along the same lines. The Court finds that the 
facts of that case are distinguishable from this case, as in that case, the officer 
received absolutely no information regarding criminal activity. He was told that there 
was a possible car prowl or burglary and that the suspect was described as a "male 
with a chunky build, possible Hispanic, wearing a white tee shirt/' Apparently, 
dispatch had received no more information than that from the anonymous calling 
informant. Because the officer did not independently observe any criminal activity 
and because the facts given to dispatch were insufficient, the level two stop of the 
defendant in Case was suppressed. The most important language from that case as 
it relates to this case are as follows: "However, if the investigation culminates in 
arrest and the legality of the stop is challenged, the State becomes obligated, albeit 
after the fact, to show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion prompted issuance 
of the flyer or dispatch in the first place." Hence, the Court has looked at the original 
information supplied by Mr. Bird in his telephone call to dispatch. Not only did Mr. 
Bird give information as to why he thought the Defendant was drunk, he observed 
that the Defendant was "thoroughly intoxicated/' In addition, Officer Johnson 
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independently corroborated Mr. Bird's observations and dispatch report. 
In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that "can informant's tip constitutes reasonable suspicion to justify a 
detention or seizure of a vehicle and its driver if the information is reliable, provides 
sufficient detail of criminal activity, and is confirmed by the investigating officer. 
A tip from a citizen informant who gives his or her name is highly reliable because 
the police may verify the information and it subjects the informant to penalty if the 
information is false. Furthermore, unlike a paid police informant, the uncompensated 
citizen-informer's motive is community concern rather than self-interest." 
In this case, the informant identified himself by giving his name and phone number 
to dispatch. Both he and his wife later gave written statements to police that were 
used at the preliminary hearing. Their names were Travis and Heidi Bird (who was 
in the background during the dispatch call), citizen informants who called dispatch. 
The information they told dispatch was relayed to Officer Johnson in written form 
on his laptop computer. That information included an accurate description of the 
vehicle and its location. It also included Mr. Bird's conclusion that the Defendant 
was intoxicated and his reasons for that belief. 
In addition to the Defendant's repeated weaving within the lane. Officer Johnson had 
been told by dispatch that he was reporting to the area of the Sports Park on a report 
of an intoxicated motorist. Officer Johnson was able to quickly find a car that 
matched the description of the information given to him by dispatch, i.e. a green-
colored Jeep Cherokee with dealer plates with the same number relayed by Mr. Bird. 
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Officer Johnson found the vehicle in the area of the Sports Parkjust as Mr. Bird had 
informed dispatch regarding the car's location. 
9. Accordingly, Mr. Bird's information was reliable and was corroborated by what the 
officer found, i.e. the same vehicle, same description, same dealer license plate 
number, etc. 
10. Furthermore, Mr. Bird's information provided sufficient detail of criminal activity, 
as follows: 
a. The driver walked past Mr. Bird and his son, who the Defendant tried to talk 
with. 
b. Both Mr. Bird and his wife smelled alcohol on the Defendant's breath. 
c. The Defendant was "thoroughly intoxicated." based on the way he was 
acting. 
d. The Defendant tried to strike up a conversation with Mr. Bird's "little boy"' 
e. The Defendant got behind the wheel of a vehicle and dro"\ e away from the 
Sports Park. 
11. In sum, Mr. Bird's tip constitutes reasonable suspicion to justify Officer Johnson's 
level two stop of the Defendant because 1) Mr. Bird's information was reliable. 2) 
Mr. Bird's information provided sufficient detail of criminal activity, and 3) Mr. 
Bird's information was confirmed by Officer Johnson, the investigating officer. 
12. Because Officer Johnson had reasonable suspicion to investigate the Defendant as a 
possible intoxicated motorist, in violation of the DUI statute, his le\ el two stop of the 
Defendant was legally justified and was not a constitutional violation of the 
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Defendant's rights. 
13. Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
,<K 
SIGNED this I day of _ h^d , 2008 
Judge Claudia Layc<xy: - l
 A • 
Fourth District Court Judge -.* -;? 
